Lo spazio della persona. Alcune precisazioni sulle teorie del comportamento razionale e sull’individualismo metodologico

digital

Articolo

rivista	STUDI DI SOCIOLOGIA
fascicolo	STUDI DI SOCIOLOGIA - 2003 - 4
titolo	Lo spazio della persona. Alcune precisazioni sulle teorie del comportamento razionale e sull’individualismo metodologico
Autore	Antonio La Spina
Editore	Vita e Pensiero
formato	Articolo \| Pdf
online da	09-2017
issn	0039-291X (stampa) \| 1827-7896 (digitale)

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Descrizione
According to a certain version of methodological individualism, the concept of person should not be used in strict sociological analysis, because all we need is referring to idealtypical individuals acting on the basis of standard reasons. The paper shows that the explanation of individual behaviour needs, at some crucial points, a good deal more than such a limited concept of social action. Why individual actors adhere to a given model of rational behaviour, or shift to a new one? When, why and how preferences and/or beliefs held by the same individual (multiple selves) clash between themselves? How people in real life come to terms with hard or «tragic» choices (inescapably involving losses and suffering for somebody)? In all these cases an abstract individual moved by idealtypical reasons cannot be an adequate explanatory tool. Paradoxically, in the standard version of methodological individualism it is the subjective dimension that is lacking. An empty space is left, that can only be filled through a proper use of the concept of person.

Descrizione

According to a certain version of methodological individualism, the concept of person should not be used in strict sociological analysis, because all we need is referring to idealtypical individuals acting on the basis of standard reasons. The paper shows that the explanation of individual behaviour needs, at some crucial points, a good deal more than such a limited concept of social action. Why individual actors adhere to a given model of rational behaviour, or shift to a new one? When, why and how preferences and/or beliefs held by the same individual (multiple selves) clash between themselves? How people in real life come to terms with hard or «tragic» choices (inescapably involving losses and suffering for somebody)? In all these cases an abstract individual moved by idealtypical reasons cannot be an adequate explanatory tool. Paradoxically, in the standard version of methodological individualism it is the subjective dimension that is lacking. An empty space is left, that can only be filled through a proper use of the concept of person.