Antonio La Spina

According to a certain version of methodological individualism, the concept of person should not be used in strict sociological analysis, because all we need is referring to idealtypical individuals acting on the basis of standard reasons. The paper shows that the explanation of individual behaviour needs, at some crucial points, a good deal more than such a limited concept of social action. Why individual actors adhere to a given model of rational behaviour, or shift to a new one? When, why and how preferences and/or beliefs held by the same individual (multiple selves) clash between themselves? How people in real life come to terms with hard or «tragic» choices (inescapably involving losses and suffering for somebody)? In all these cases an abstract individual moved by idealtypical reasons cannot be an adequate explanatory tool. Paradoxically, in the standard version of methodological individualism it is the subjective dimension that is lacking. An empty space is left, that can only be filled through a proper use of the concept of person.